Myth: Homo economicus is a valid assumption of human
behavior.
Fact: Homo economicus is a fiction useful to right-wing
economists.
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Summary
Most social scientists believe that
human behavior is often complex, contradictory, imperfect and unpredictable.
Economists, however, use a model of human behavior called Homo
economicus, who is endowed with perfect (or abnormally high) rationality,
self-interest and knowledge. Besides the obvious fact that humans aren't
perfect, the model suffers from other basic problems. Humans are ultimately
driven by their emotions, not their logic, and emotions are often irrational.
Nor are humans 100 percent self-interested. They perform altruistic acts like
charity, volunteerism, lending a helping hand, parenting and even giving one's
life for one's country. They also perform self-destructive acts like substance
abuse, negative addiction, negative risk-taking, procrastination, inability to
complete projects, masochism, and suicide. Nor are people highly knowledgeable
about all their affairs; they can be expert in only a few topics at a time. The
reasons why economist use such a flawed model as Homo economicus is
because it makes their economic analysis simpler and allows them to generate
results that confirm their pet prejudices. Such methodology, however, leads to
inaccurate conclusions.
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Argument
Since economic activity is a human
activity, it follows that economics must be premised on some model of human
behavior. But where do we find the best one? Therein lies the controversy.
Right-wing economists have their own model, called Homo economicus, or
"Economic Man." It stands in sharp contrast to the model drawn by psychologists,
sociologists, biologists, liberal economists and other social
scientists.
Specifically, social scientists believe that human behavior
is often complex, imperfect, limited, self-contradictory and unpredictable.
Homo economicus, however, is a greatly simplified model which assumes
that individuals possess the following traits:
- Perfect self-interest
- Perfect rationality
- Perfect information
Of course, humans aren't perfect, and
right-wing economists concede -- albeit begrudgingly -- that a strong version of
Homo economicus is unrealistic. That's why more moderate economists hold
to a weaker version, in which these traits are not quite perfect, but still
abnormally high. Regardless of which one an economist uses, what unites these
two versions is the assumption that humans are "rational maximizers" who are
self-interested, who only do things for their own material gain.
This
essay is divided into two parts. First, we'll show why either version of Homo
economicus is a deeply flawed model of human behavior. Second, we'll reveal
the less than noble reasons why right-wing economists use such a flawed
model.
THE FLAWS OF HOMO ECONOMICUS
Let's look at
each of the three traits of Homo economicus -- self-interest, rationality
and information -- and see how they violate the findings of the other social
sciences.
Rationality
Rationality is defined as "the
ability to reason" and "to exercise good judgment." Humans of course possess
these traits, but they are not the ultimate driving force behind human behavior.
One of the basic facts of modern psychology is that our intellect serves our
emotions, not vice versa. Human behavior is not primarily the result of logical
cost-benefit analysis, but of emotions like love, hate, loneliness, fear, greed,
anxiety, sexual attraction, pleasure, pain, etc. We use our intellect only to
fulfill or avoid these emotional states.
Let's consider the first half of
the definition of rationality: "the ability to reason." Just one example of how
emotions are irrational in this sense is sexual attraction. We do not "decide"
or "think" to become sexually attracted to someone; we just are, thanks to our
genes and hormones. The only role of the intellect here is to formulate a mating
strategy.
Now let's consider the second half of the definition of
rationality: "the ability to exercise good judgment." Just one example of how
emotions are irrational in this sense is self-destructive behavior like
alcoholism. People become addicted to alcohol because it chemically induces an
emotional state: euphoria. But while pursuing this emotional state, alcoholics
destroy their lives. George Vaillant is perhaps the nation's leading authority
on alcoholism, and he offers the following portrait of an alcoholic's career.
Most alcoholics go on and off the wagon, but their condition progressively
worsens as they reach middle age. They will generally lose everything dear to
them: their family, their friends, their jobs, their homes, their possessions,
their reputations. Finally they will hit bottom: they will have nothing left to
lose but their lives. This is the turning point for most. Roughly a third will
die or stay in horrible shape at the bottom, another third will become
abstinent, and another third will shift to more responsible social drinking.
(1)
Although one might argue that most alcoholics ultimately do the
rational thing at bottom and choose survival, the point is that the 20-year
slide to the bottom is not rational in the first place. Losing a job would be a
negative incentive that would compel a truly rational person to stop drinking.
But the alcoholic goes on to the next negative incentive -- losing one's family
-- and then on to the next -- losing one's house -- and so on, without ever
making the obvious rational choice. And all in the pursuit of an emotional
state.
A large part of the reason why alcoholics aren't rational is
because they are in denial. In other words, they've constructed their own
alternate reality to protect themselves from the ugly truth about their
condition. For instance, they often blame everyone else for the negative events
in their lives, when in fact people are just reacting as they normally would to
a problematic person.
This sort of irrationality (or "rationalization")
is not isolated to alcoholics. To varying degrees, we all rationalize our
reality. The consensus of modern psychologists on this point is overwhelming,
and finds its best expression in Cognitive Dissonance Theory, first advanced in
1957 by famed psychologist Leon Festinger.
A "cognition" is a belief or
attitude. "Dissonance" is an inconsistency between cognitions, or between
cognitions and actions. For example, dissonance occurs when you hit someone
(say, on a regular basis) and then feel guilty about it between times.
Dissonance is unpleasant, so people seek to reduce this unpleasantness by
changing either their behavior or their cognition. In the above example, you
could either stop hitting someone, or else stop feeling guilty about it ("He or
she deserved it"). Most of the time, it's easier to change one's beliefs than
behavior, especially when the behavior is addictive, pleasurable, genetic, etc.
Psychologists have concluded that people create rationalizations or
justifications for their beliefs and actions to maintain psychological stability
-- they do not generally come to those beliefs or actions through
objective rationality and self-interest.
(2)
Self-interest
It is a scientific fact that people are
not 100 percent self-interested. If they were, we would not see such altruistic
behavior as charity (especially towards strangers), volunteerism, parenting,
lending a helping hand, sacrifice, martyrdom or giving up one's life for one's
country. Nor would we see such self-destructive behavior as substance abuse,
negative addiction, negative risk-taking, procrastination, inability to complete
projects, masochism, suicide, etc.
Contrary to all the above examples,
the strong version of Homo economicus assumes that everything people do
is for their own material gain. And, true, this would be an excellent individual
survival strategy. Both sociologists and biologists agree that humans compete
for limited resources. Those with more resources are able to compete better and
survive longer. We can see this in our statistics: in the U.S., the poor have
six times the death rate of the rich. (3) That's because people with wealth can
afford better health care, better diets, better education and information, safer
and less toxic homes and workplaces, more creature comforts, greater efficiency
of survival, etc. Under no circumstances, then, should a truly self-interested
individual do anything that surrenders wealth or health to others.
Yet
parenting does exactly that, in many ways. First, a couple having sex could lose
their health or even their lives to sexual disease. Women risk death at
childbirth -- and did so at shockingly high rates in pre-modern times. Both
parents must also sacrifice considerable time and wealth to raise their
children. (Until the 20th century, children eventually became economic assets,
but the vast majority of child labor profited the aristocrat or company owner,
not the parents, whose children brought home pittance wages.) And if children
are ever threatened, parents will sacrifice life and limb to protect them.
Objectively, parenting is one of the most anti-individual things a person can
do. Natural selection only overcame this impediment by creating overwhelming
emotional incentives to parent -- namely, sexual attraction, sexual pleasure,
maternal and paternal instincts, etc. These emotional incentives prove that
human nature is designed for more than just individual
survival.
Biologists recognize four levels of survival: the gene, the
individual, the group, and the specie. All of them interact to produce the
complex and often paradoxical behavior we witness in humans. The error of
Homo economicus is that it focuses only on one level: the individual. It
cannot explain why couples bear children (to promote genetic survival), or why
soldiers often sacrifice their lives in war (to promote group survival), or why
people practice charity (to promote human survival).
Some defenders of
Homo economicus therefore turn to its weaker version -- an Economic Man
who responds to emotional as well as material incentives. In The Armchair
Economist, Steven Landsburg opens his first chapter thus: "Most of economics
can be summarized in four words: 'People respond to incentives.' The rest is
commentary." (4) According to this viewpoint, humans respond to financial and
emotional incentives to maximize their "utility" (happiness). Certainly we can
see the selfishness of people who try to satisfy their sexual and parental
urges, even if doing so reduces their individual health and wealth.
But
this too fails, because emotional incentives are often anti-individualistic. It
is nonsensical to claim that people can be 100 percent self-interested and yet
pursue anti-individualistic behaviors at the same time. Smoking is a prime
example. According to economists, smokers are maximizing their happiness both
when they start smoking and when they quit. But as any smoker will tell you,
only the first few weeks of smoking bring on a pleasurable rush -- after that,
it's a nasty habit whose only pleasure is the relief provided by avoiding
withdrawal symptoms. And this is not to mention the financial costs, health
problems and early deaths that accompany smoking. It is actually not
smoking -- as opposed to smoking -- that maximizes happiness.
At this
point, it's best to abandon both versions of Homo economicus and
acknowledge the four levels of human
survival.
Information
Will Rogers once said, "Everybody is
ignorant, only on different subjects." In other words, each hour you spend
becoming an expert in, say, medicine is an hour you did not spend studying some
other subject. And if you become an expert in medicine, it can only be in a very
narrow sub-discipline, like surgery, pediatric care or pharmacology. Even in
these sub-disciplines, there is practically an infinite amount to learn, and
experts in them can never fully master them.
Although these observations
seem like common sense, they are ones that economists frequently forget. How?
Often, economists argue that national problems are solved by people learning
some bit of information, something usually just beyond the realm of common
knowledge. But when this solution is repeated for every national problem, the
information demands quickly become overwhelming. Economists who posit this
solution for every national problem forget its own cumulative effect.
For
example, economists assume that people adjust their price and wage demands by
watching changes in Federal Reserve policy. This may seem simple, but it
requires people to know exactly where to find such data, to be able to afford
it, to acquire it on a regular basis, and to know how to use it in their
calculations. Meanwhile, on another front, economists assume that people know
whether to consume or save depending on whether the government is running a
deficit. Again, this involves all the above information costs and requirements.
Multiply this by a thousand other problems, and you can easily see that people
cannot handle the information overload.
For these reasons, people cannot
be true experts in all their affairs -- only a few of them. Which means that
ignorance, not informed analysis, is the chief characteristic of society. The
only reason why society appears so successful is because everyone is an expert
at something, and they socially and economically interact. In sum, it is our
collective knowledge, not individual knowledge, which solves national
problems.
Examples of how real people differ from Homo
economicus
Countless experiments and examples show the
fallaciousness of Homo economicus.
Cornell economist Richard
Thaler conducted a famous experiment in which he gave half his students coffee
mugs that normally cost $6.00. He then invited students to buy, sell or keep
their mugs, at whatever price they wanted to negotiate among themselves.
Economic theory predicts that roughly half the mugs should change hands, and
that mug-owners and non-mug owners would agree on the objective value of the
mug, and therefore an average price. But in four different experiments,
something different happened. Mug-owners demanded an average of $5.25; non-mug
owners were willing to pay no more than $2.75. Consequently, only 12.5 percent
of the mugs traded. In theory, both owners and non-owners were asking themselves
the same question: the value of the mug. But somehow, the value of
possession of the mug also worked itself into the equation. Apparently,
humans have an instinctive and "irrational" predisposition to hoard material
wealth. (5)
In 1985, Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer conducted the
following experiment on rationality. They devised a simple game in which two
people decide how to split $14. The rules allowed the players to split the money
however they wanted. However, if no agreement was reached, then the first player
would receive $12 and the second player would receive nothing. According to
cooperative game theory, the most logical result is that the second player
should agree to $1 and let first player take $13. That's because if the second
player tries for anything more, he gets nothing since the first player can
simply disagree and collect $12 anyway. So, under no circumstances should the
first player agree to anything less than $13. But something very different
happened during the actual experiment. When players 1 and 2 were determined by a
coin toss, the players always agreed to split the money evenly… $7
apiece! (6) It appears that people are often more motivated by fair play, easy
solutions or some other factor than "rational maximization."
Studies also
show that people still tip in restaurants that they do not expect to visit
again, in contrast to Homo economicus, who is predicted to keep his money
since no retribution will result. Other experiments show that large numbers of
people are willing to return lost wallets, cash intact, with no expectation of
reward. Obviously, people often engage in civil behavior, not just out of virtue
and morality, but because such behavior makes for a smoother running and more
efficient society and economy. (7)
Another obvious irrationality is
advertising. Take one of the most successful advertising ploys of all time: the
inclusion of sexy young women in beer commercials. The implication of these
commercials is "Drink our beer, get this girl." Interestingly enough, these
subliminal messages work -- such beer ads are wildly successful. But a message
closer to the truth is "Get this beer gut, drive this girl away." One of the
more amusing topics in right-wing economics is the defense of such advertising
as "rational."
WHY ECONOMISTS USE HOMO
ECONOMICUS
There are at least three reasons why economists use
Homo economicus, none of them noble.
The first is that Homo
economicus makes economic analysis relatively simple. In real life,
accurately predicting or explaining human behavior is extremely difficult. To
simplify this task, economists simplify the human being. This means assuming the
traits of humans to be 100 percent… as in 100 percent self-interested, 100
percent rational, etc. Such purity of traits allows them to make
predictions.
Of course, this raises the question of how realistic and
therefore valuable these models actually are. A good analogy to this problem is
the shape of the earth. For simplicity's sake, we call the earth "round." But in
reality, the earth is an irregular ellipse characterized by mountains, valleys,
polar caps, etc. In the real world, we have to do the hard work of actually
mapping these irregularities (by land survey, satellite radar, laser ranging,
etc.). This is the only way we can perform practical functions like navigating,
determining property boundaries, transmitting radio signals or shooting cruise
missiles. Assuming that the earth is perfectly round allows us to do none of
these things. A scientist might assume a "round" earth in his calculations, and
defend his action by claiming that it makes his work easier. It does that, all
right, but it also makes his results more inaccurate and useless.
Second,
such simplifications allow economists to make their discipline more
mathematical. If humans are "rational maximizers," then its possible to describe
their preferences numerically… for example, a person should prefer $40 to $30.
(Forget the fact that people might prefer the $30 course of action for reasons
of sentimentality, charity, boycotting, or other non-economic factors.)
Economists also love mathematics because it carries an air of certainty and
authority. They would love nothing more than to be counted among the hard
sciences, like physics or chemistry. The so-called "soft" sciences like
sociology and psychology only earn their contempt. But, truth be told, economics
is a branch of sociology.
Third, by picking and choosing the right
starting assumptions, economists can generate results that confirm their pet
prejudices. An example is a study on the death penalty by economist Isaac
Ehrlich. (8) In attempting to prove that the death penalty deters murder,
Ehrlich calculated how changes in America's execution rate affected its murder
rate. Of course, executions aren't the only social factor that affect the murder
rate, and one of Ehrlich's challenges was to identify these other factors and
account for them. In his model, Ehrlich held the following factors constant:
- Unemployment
- Labor force participation
- Per-capita income
- Racial and age characteristics
- The probable arrest rate in murder cases
- The conditional probability of conviction for arrested murder
suspects.
Limited to these factors, Ehrlich found that the death
penalty offers a substantial deterrent to murder. However, he neglected all of
the following factors:
- The length of prison sentences for murder
- The availability of guns
- Income inequality
- Poverty
- Media violence
- Changing family structures
- The revolutionary and changing social forces of the 1960s, a period
Ehrlich's study covered. This era saw rising racial tensions, anti-war
protest, new sexual mores, greater drug use, greater television viewing, etc.
When these factors are accounted for, the deterrence effect in
Ehrlich's study disappears.
Economists respond that no model ever has a
complete set of starting assumptions. This is true -- there are probably
countless hundreds of factors that contribute to any social phenomenon, all of
varying significance. But scientists should identify as many of the significant
factors as they can. This is the only way to reduce the margin of error to
acceptable levels. To neglect any major known factor is to conduct second-rate
science.
Return to Overview
Endnotes:
1. Martin Seligman,
What You Can Change and What You Can't (New York: Fawcett Columbine,
1993), p. 210.
2. For a review, see Elliot Aronson, The Social
Animal (New York: W.C. Freeman and Company, 1992) and Leon Festinger's
Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 1957.
3. Robert Pear, "Big Health
Gap, Tied to Income, Is Found in U.S." The New York Times, July 8, 1993,
pp. A1. For other studies showing the greater mortality rates of the poor, see
George Davey Smith and others, "Socioeconomic Differentials in Mortality Risk
among Men Screened for the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial: I. White
Men," American Journal of Public Health Vol. 86, No. 4 (April, 1996), pp.
486-496; George Davey Smith and others, "Socioeconomic Differentials in
Mortality Risk among Men Screened for the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention
Trial: II. Black Men," American Journal of Public Health Vol. 86, No. 4
(April, 1996), pp. 497-504; Gopal K. Singh and Stella M. Yu, "US Childhood
Mortality, 1950 through 1993: Trends and Socioeconomic Differentials,"
American Journal of Public Health Vol. 86, No. 4 (April, 1996), pp.
505-512; C. Wayne Sells and Robert Wm. Blum, "Morbidity and Mortality among US
Adolescents: An Overview of Data and Trends," American Journal of Public
Health Vol. 86, No. 4 (April, 1996), pp. 513-519.
4. Steven
Landsburg, The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday Life (New York:
Free Press, 1993).
5. Richard Thaler, The Winner's Curse (New
York: Free Press, 1992), p. 65.
6. Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer,
"Entitlements, Rights and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects'
Concepts of Distributive Justice," Journal of Legal Studies, 14, 1985, p.
259.
7. Tipping: Thaler, p. 212. Wallets: Robert Kuttner, Everything
for Sale, (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, Inc., 1996), p. 62.
8. Isaac
Ehrlich, "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death," American Economic Review, (June 1975).